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WORK-SHARING 
This analysis has been used in preparatory  consult~tions. ' 
Covering Note 
At  the June 1977  Tripartite Conference,  it was agreed 
to develop Work-sharing as one  of the  four priority themes. 
The  issue is of particular concern to the Social Partners and 
the Commission,  and is on  the  agenda  for  the  next Standing 
Employment  Committee,  planned  for  the  first quarter of 1978. 
The  attached report is offerred as a  basis for  a  first 
·discussion between the Social Partners and  the Services of 
the Commission,  in order to prepare  the  document  for  the 
Standing Committee.  The  report  explores the different aspects 
of the  question as  formulated  by  the President  of the Conference, 
Mr.  Healey,  "What  are  the  cost  effectiveness and  implications 
for industrial performance  of different means  of work-sharing?" 
In order to ensure  a  full  and  frank  discussion,  the 
Commission has refrained  from  stating its own  position in this 
working  document.  This will be  developed later when  we  have 
heard  the  views  of the participants to  the  preparatory discussion. 
The  Commission is considering adding  a  chapter in which will be 
developed  the policy problems,  the  social developments,  and 
the  consequences  of a  policy of "work-sharing",  relative  to 
the role and  the  significance of work  and of working life in 
Society. 
Since earlier discussions,  the  employment  situation has 
not  improved and  the prospects are  somewhat  worse.  The  measures 
to envisage in terms of work-sharing cannot  be  considered 
in isolation from  possible actions in the  other areas identified 
at  the Tripartite Conference.  Nevertheless,  the gravity of 
the situation leads us to search  for  the  most  appropriate 
actions at  ~ational level,  and to identify those areas where 
a  Communitylaction would be most  appropriate.  This is the 
purpose  of the  consultative discussions,  and  of the  document 
which will be  established on the basis of  such discussions 
tor the next  session of the Standing Employment  Committee. 
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31 INTRODUCTIOR 
The  paper attempts,  firstly,  to evaluate work-sharing 
as an strategy in the  struggle.  to reduce current unemployment, 
and to promote better longer-term employment  policies in the 
Community. 
In the light of this strategy,  the problems and possible 
consequences of the introduction of the  different work-sharing 
measures are considered. 
The  paper has three preliminary chapters  : 
•  The  Background,  setting out  the reasons why  the 
work  sharing option need to be  considered  • 
•  The  possible  forms  of work-sharins,  exploring the 
character and  aims  of different possibilities  • 
•  The  current working-time patterns in terms of the 
level and distribution of hours and weeks worked in 
the year,  identifying differences between Member  States 
and  sectors. 
In terms of Strategl,  chapter 4,  the paper looks first at 
the different  objections to work-sharing in order to evaluate 
them.  From  this are distilled certain Principles for action, 
chapter 5,  covering both actiona,to be  encouraged and actions 
to be avoided in the  development  of work-sharing measures. 
Assessments of specific measures,  chapter 6,  are carried out 
in the light of these principles. ( .  ) 
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THE  BACKGROUND 
At  the Tripartite Conference in June 1977,  all those 
taking part agreed that overall progress in the areas of 
growth  and  employment  was  disappointing.  Since  then the 
prospects have,  if anything,  deteriorated.  Unemployment 
figures as a  whole  are tending to increase:  in September 1977 
for the  first time  there were  mo,re  than 6  million registered 
unemployed  in the Community;  in·certain groups and  regions 
the labour market  situation is deteriorating particularly 
rapidly.  Both  the provisional  economic  budget  for  1978  and 
the medium-term prospects until 1980 (•)  give  grounds to 
fear that,  without  additional  economic  measures,  the  emplo~~ent 
problem cannot be  satisfactoril7 solved. 
Important causes are  : 
- large public  expenditure deficits combined with 
high rates of inflation and  marked weaknesses in 
the balance of payments prevent  a  general change 
to an expansionist  economic  policy; 
demographic  trends indicate a  medium-term increase 
in the available manpower in ell Member  States. 
Over  the next  five years the  number of people of 
working  age  (16  to  6~) vill gradually increase 
- from  aro·and  161  million in 1977 to around 168 
million in 1982c  (••)  Labour market participation 
cannot be  expected to offset this trend without 
intervention; 
migrant  employment  is stabilising. Immigrants no 
longer return home  in large numbers but are becoming 
permanent  residents.  Members  of their families are 
also entering the labour market. 
Prospects  for  1980,  Report  by the Stvdy Group  on Medium-Term 
Economic  Assessments,  II/236/3/77. 
According to hitherto unpublished calculations b7. an 
Expert Group  of the Coaaieaion. 
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All these points make  a  medium-term labour surplus 
more  likely. The  traditional labour market policy of job-
creation and the  smooth balancing of supply and  demand 
provides some  relief,  but meets with financial  and practical 
limitations. 
In the  search for  alternatives,  the Commission is 
pursuing various courses - its follow-up  work  to the 
Tripartite Conference is typical of this.  As  a  general 
principle it prefers policies aimed at increasing employment. 
On  the  other hand,  it does not  consider the  deliberate 
curbing of technical progress to be  a  suitable  solution, 
as this weakens  our long-term competitive positiono 
Such is the background to the  discussion  on work-sharing 
as a  means  of improving  the distribution of available work 
among  those  seeking  employment.  It is not  an  easy strategy 
for  solving the problem and calls for  supplety.  The 
long-lasting and  grave  employment  crisis has made  it more 
relevent.  Admittedly,  many  questions surround its practical 
application and its effectiveness is hard to assess because 
of limited experience.  As  a  way  of reducing  unemployment, 
work-sharing represents a  second best solution.  Only if 
measures to increase  employment  are unsuccessful  should 
work-sharing be  used  for this purpose.  However, 
related social policy objectives,  such as better working 
conditions or greater  freedom  to choose  between  employment 
and  free  time,  assume  an independent  and less controversial role. 
In the  event  of certain work-sharing measures being applied we 
should examine  the  extent to which the desire to reduce 
unemployment  now  coincides with long•term social and· employment 
policy goals. 
THE  POSSIBLE  FORMS  OF  WORK-SHARING 
The  general  aim  of work-sharing as understood here 
is simple  to define:  the  volume  of work available in the 
entire  •conomy is to be  organized in such a  way  that all 
those wishing to work  can  find at least partial employment. 
The  volume  of work,  which  remains an abstract,  but  not necessarily 
constant  figure,  is influenced by  three basic  factors  : 
t~e activity rate,  working hours and net migration. 
This  document  is concerned only with the  relationship 
between the variables "activity rate"  and  "working hours". 
Immigration has been controlled by  the Member  States for 
some  time  by  means  of a  restrictive policy towards non-member 
countries.  A change  in this policy is not  envisaged. 
The  overall aim  should be  achieved by  means  of measures 
which are  designed to provide  work  for  those  so  far  unempJ~oved, 
to avoid  further dismissals and to improve  unsatisfactory 
workins conditione. 
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Work-sharing  can be  achieved either through  some· of 
those  currently employed giving up  their jobs to persons 
who  up  to then had no  job,  or  through a  new  arrangement  of 
working  time  by  which  the existing work  may  be  shared among 
more  workers.  This work-sharing implies income-sharing  between 
workers  (wages)  on the  one  side and  job-seekers (unemployment 
benefit etc  ••  )  and  the  inactive  (pensions etc  •• )  on  the  other 
side. 
The  formulae  under  discussion are  quite conventional: 
the long-familiar individual and collective options  for  a 
shorter working  week,  working  year or working life. Only  the 
objective is new  - to ease  the  employment  problems.  Priority 
would  be  given to workers already in the labour market. 
Whether  the  self-employed and  people  who  have  not  yet  been 
employed  can be  covered by  these is dealt with in pages 10-14. 
In the present  discussions,  the  following are  emerging 
as the  most  important  forme  of work-sharing&  · 
1)  flexible,  earlier or more  suitable retirement age 
2)  longer period of education and  training 
3)  temporary interruption of careers for  personal reasons 
(e.g. bringing up  children)  or personal  development  (e.g. 
"permanentu  education) 
4)  reduction in actual number  of hours worked per  day or per week 
5)  longer annual holidays  (including  t~aining leave) 
6)  restricted overtime  and  special shifts 
7)  additional (flexible)  part-time  employment. 
This list does not  include  short-time working.  This is 
a  tried and tested instrument  for protecting employment  in 
the Member  States. In type it belongs to the  defensive work-
sharing measures,  intended to prevent  the  slide of workers 
into unemployment  in a  abort-term business recession,  thus 
easing the labour market.  The  actual extent of short-time 
working in the Community  cannot  be  clearly established because 
of differing national practice;  in September 1977  a  total of 
around  483.000 cases were  registered,  with a·  seasonal tendency 
to rise sharply.  When  the  Belgian and German  figures are 
converted,  they  form  the  equivalent of over 16'0  000  unemployed. 
The  Commission  supports the practice,  proved  sound in the 
Member  States,  of introducing short-time working in economic 
difficulties; it is fully  aware  of the  financial difficulties 
connected with this measure  over longer periods of time. 
Completely new  modele  for  coordinating working  time  are 
not  included in this list, e.g. proposals which  have  as yet 
barely advanced beyond  the  experimental  stage,  such as annual 
work-time  contracts or ·the  allocation of certain time  quotas 
to i·ndividuals or to whole  households.  Their main  object is 
greater flexibility in working life; their possible contribution 
to reducing unemploJment,  however,  ia leaa clear. 
.;. '  . ' 
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The  seven types of measure  selected can be  grouped 
together in several ways,  of which the most  common  is 
classification according to their approach to employment 
policy.  A distinction is made  according to whether the 
manpower  pool is reduced  (types 1  to 3)  or the  working hours 
of those in emploJment  are cut  down  (types 4  to 7). In the 
first  group,  either the start of working life is delayed or 
retirement is brought  forward,  or working life is temporarily 
interrupted.  At  the  same  time,  it is directed at particular 
problem  groups on  the labour market  (especially young  people, 
· less qualified  pe~sons, elderly people,  handicapped people 
and women),  for  whom  ways  of escaping  from  the  unemployment 
trap will be  opened  up.  The  second  group has a  more  indirect 
effect;  by reducing the number  of hours worked  by individuals, 
the largest possible number  of workers (hitherto unemployed) 
should be mobilized. 
Another  important criterion for  the classification of 
these measures is their legal basis.  Which  are  influenced by 
the State and which by wage  agreements?  As  regards measure 
types 4  to 7,  the State merely lays down  the  framework 
conditions which are  developed and  made  specific by collective, 
company  or individual agreements  - unless the State itself 
steps in as employer. 
Types 1  and 2  are largely within the legislative 
competence  of the State alone,  although both sides of industry 
are  frequently able  to exercise influence within the  framework 
of autonomous bodies or other  forms  of participation. This 
higher competence  of whether  the individual views the particular 
measure  as an opportunity or as an obligation placed upon  him. 
Finally,  type 3  can be  allocated to either group according 
to how  it is applied. 
This classification,  often overlooked in public  discussion, 
is of decisive  significance  for  the practical implementation 
and  financing of proposals  for work-sharing. It will also have 
to be  taken into consideration in our own  recommendations. 
THE  CURRENT  WORKING  TIME  PATTERNS 
The  significance  of the  time  factor  in the working life 
of each individual is constantlr changing.  In society as a  whole, 
several characteristic changes c.n be  detected. Time-budget 
analyses give  th~ time  spent at  ~ork by  one  employed person as 
12  to 15  ~·of his life-span on  average;  a  century ago  the  percentage 
was more  than twice this  figure~ Gradually,  operating hours have 
become  •ore and,more  distinct  from  working  hours;  the balance 
between working  time  and  free ti•e has been  improved. 
./. 
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In a  similar way,  the  emphasis  has  shifted as regards 
working hours.  Until recently,  priority wae  given not to 
quantitative reductions,  but to worthwhile  interruptions 
and qualitative restructuring.  Working hours were  not  only 
a  parameter  for  calculating wages,  but  had to be  adapted 
to  the  requirements of a  human  working  environment. 
Characteristic of this approach  wer~ more  flexible  working 
hours and greater opportunity to choose  between  work,  training 
and leisure. 
If working  hours  now  change with the policy emphasis 
shifting to aspects of employment,  then these  recent  developments 
should  be  borne  in mind.  Work-sharing  does not  simply mean  a 
quantitative reduction of working  hours,  but rather a  restructuring 
of working  hours,  consisting of a  number  of elements  (''reduction", 
"sharing",  "flexibility",  "breaks" and  so  on). 
Data illustrating recent developments  and  the  present 
situation are set out in the tables in the  Annex.  These  data are  not 
complete,  because  ~ither recent  information or information for 
some  Member  States was  unavailable.  Despite  these  severe 
limitations,  the tables  show  the ·great variety of existing 
regulations and  situations which will have  to  b~ taken into 
consideration in any  future  ehangese 
In the longer term,  as working life has  shortened,  the 
working  time  per year has also fallen,  by  an  average  of 1  % a  year 
within the Community,  although not  smoothly.  Over this period 
the  statutory normal  working  week  hardly  chang~dj  but  there  has 
been  a  definite reduction in collective-sgreerr.ent-based working 
hours  and  -en a  higher level- the  hours actually worked.  This 
general  trend is to be  found  in all Member  States and all sectors. 
From  the  "harmonized" Community  statistics for all manusl workers 
in industry,  mining  and  the construction industry,  and the results 
of the Labour Force  Sample  Surve1,  it can be  seen that 
in  some  Member  States the  40-hour barrier has already been broken. 
Although  overtime  declined  over this period,  it has by no 
meaps  disappeared~  even  in the years of recession. 
{Cf.  Tables  2  to·6 ).  An  example  of this trend,  although in no 
way  representative  or  the whole  Community,  ca.n  be  found  in 
Table 3,  which  gives the  hours worked per week  by French workers 
in companies  e~ploying more  than 10 people. This table  shows 
that in January 1977  about  3  % of all workers  worked less than 
40 hours,  37  % worked  exactly 40 hours,  31  ~ up  to 44  hours, 
24 % up  to q8  hours  and  4 % 48  hours  or more. 
In  some  Member  States (Belgium,  Netherlands,  Germany, 
United  Kingdom)  working  hours increased again between 1975  and 1976, 
in others working  hours fell.  The  longest hours  were  worked  in the 
British mining  industry and  the French and  British construction 
industries.  In general,  the smallest number  of hours are worked 
in Belgium.  (Cf.  Table 4)  Only  the  breakdown according to sectors 
and regions,  of course,  reveals the  full  spectrum of differences  • 
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In Table 5,  one  or  two  "extrente  values" are  given;  only  e  few 
values are  shown  for  each Member  State (Ireland and  Denmark  are 
not  represented in the statistics). 
Even  in Belgium,  extremely long hours are worked  in  some 
sectors  (46.1  hours in the  "extraction of non-energy minerals and 
peat-cutting"),  the broadest  spectrum can be  observed in the 
United Kingdom  (47.9  hours in cement  production  - 36.8 in the 
clothing industry),  while in Italy and  the  Netherlands  the  hours 
worked  in the various sectors are  fairly similar. 
The  most  recent variations in working hours  should be  looked 
at in connection with  the  trends in short-time working,  as set  out 
in Table  7. After the  clear improvement  in the situation last year, 
the number  of those  registering as  short-time workers is once 
again  showing  a  marked  increase. 
Table 8  is intended to  draw attention once  again  ~o the 
volume  of overtime.  Relatively up-to-date  information is given  for 
Great Britain. It indicates that in March  1977  about 35  % of all 
workers in manufacturing industries did  overtime.  The  proportions 
vary  from  9  ~ in the cloting and  footwear  industry to 50 % in 
mechanical  engineering.  The  average  overtime  worked  per  employee 
per week  is 8.6 hours,  ranging  from 5.6 hours  (clothing and 
footwear  industry)  to 10.9  hours  (coal and  petroleum-based 
products). 
As  Table  10  shows,  the  reduction of the working week  has 
been accompanied  by  an  extension  of paid holiday.  By  1976,  in all 
Member  States except  Ireland and the  United  Kingdom,  4  weeks' 
holiday had  become  customary. 
Tables 11  and  12  provide  info:nnation  on  the  distribution 
of part-time  employment  in the Member  States and  the  most 
important  sectors.  The  data  from  the 1975  Community  sample 
survey of the labour  force,  whilst national  figures  can  hardly 
be  compared  because  of the  different  definitions usedo  on· 
average,  9.3 million were  employed  on  a  part-time basis in 
the Community  in Spring 1975.  Of  these,  approximately 1.3 
million were  men  and 8  million women.  The  distribution according 
to sector was as  follows  :  69  ~ in the tertiary sector,  22  % 
in industry and 9  ~ in agriculture - with considerable variations 
from  country to country. 
Tables 13  and  14  give  only  a  rough indication of 
retirement  and  school-leaving ages.  The  normal  retirement 
age  ranges  from  67  for  men  and  women  in Ireland to 55  for 
women  in Italy. Understandably,  the  range  covered by  the 
minimum  school-leaving age ie,  at 14  to 16,  much  narrower, 
although no  comparable  figures  on  the average duration of 
schooling  and  training are available. 
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As  ve  shal.l  see 1-at.er  in this report,  some actions in the 
work-sharing  fie·la  coul·d.  help to  improve  the  employment  situation, 
but  they will require oa-reful attention to .aet:ail if they are 
to  suce~ed  •. 
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Past  experience 
Some  peop1e,  lookins to paet  experience  (e.g. France 1936), 
contest the value  of work-•haring in employment  polic7. 
This first argument is certainly the weakest.  It could 
just as well be  turned on its head,  but  even then would  not 
reach the heart of the matter.  As  long ago as the crisis-
ridden Thirties,  Germany  also  was  familiar  with 
controversy over whether working hours  should be  reduced  to 
relieve unemployment.  (•)  Although  the  arguments are  similar, 
they are based  on  completely different situations. 
It is just as wrong  to base  one's argument  on  the 
experience gained in the Fifties and Sixties.  At  that  time, 
there was  a  high level of employment;  indeed,  in some  sectors 
there was  an acute  shortage  of labour,  in spite of drastic 
reductions in working  hours  (from 48  to 40 hours)  and  other 
incisive improvements in conditions of work  (and working hours). 
At  the  same  time,  incomes  and  production were  rising.  In the 
enthusiasm  for rationalization,  individual interests often 
coincided with those of the  economy  as a  whole,  as the  danger 
of unemployment  was  of secondary importance  compared with  the 
gains in income  and leisure time. 
Compared  with  those  days,  our present difficulties 
represent  a  reversal of the problem.  Concern  for  jobs is now 
dominant,  and it is now  more  difficult to achieve  sizable 
increases in productivity,  for  several reasons:  these include 
improved  techniques  for  calculating the input  of capital and 
lavour (relatively high capital equipment  and  labour intensity, 
more  refined working  methods  and  organization),  the  reduced 
scope  for action in the  continuing economic  crisis,  and  the 
change  which has occurred in the attitudes of workers and their 
representatives.  Furthermore,  companies are  cutting-back their 
recruitment plana.  Under-utilized capacity,  higher costs and 
dubious  economic  prospects do  not  allow  any  generous gestures 
and lead to  a  cautious recruitment policy. 
The  alteration in the basic position,  that it,  the 
improvement  in social welfare  arrangements,  also indicates a 
change  in the  situation· since  the Fifties and Sixties. The 
developments described previously are typified by the  great 
variety and number  of national and  sectoral arrangements  and 
the  different  forms  that  they take.  There is no  doubt  that 
the  effects on  employment  vary with the  length of the working-
week,  the retirement age  and  so  on. and,  in recent  years,· social 
progress has made  rapid strides.  Furthermore,  previous changes in 
working hours were  made  gradually and with relatively little 
coordination between  them.  Work-sharing as a  modern instrument 
or employment  policy,  on  the  other hand.  would  operate as a 
rather abrupt move,  and  ae part of a  more  comprehensive  strategy  • 
(•)  See  the  essay bf Alfred E.  OTT  on  Reduction of Working  Hours 
as a  means  of combatting unemployment.  Institute for Economic 
~eeearch, TUbingen,  Januarr 1977. 
.  ;. The.latter di£ference also shows  that  th~ examples of 
the past  have  only limited application to present probJ.ems. 
'.I'he  analysis of economic  histor,- should not be  advanced  as 
proof of some  t.heory,  but as a  means  to a  better understanding 
of the correlation between  probl~ms. It is in this aenee that 
the  experiences of the 7ears of full  emp1o~ent acquire their 
value. 
Labour ·force adjustment 
The  common  denominator  for all work-sharing :me.asures, 
i.e. the use of unemployed people to fill the pote-ntially 
vacant  jobs or hours,  demands that the changeover should be 
as  smooth as possible. If large discrepancies existed  be~ween 
the  factors  to be  balanced,  the  desired effect on  employment 
Hculd  be  we-akened.  Losses in production or other problems 
might  result. 
Unquestionably,  short-term imbalances vould arist  from 
any  cocrprcheAlDive  ad  hoc work-sharing measure..,  This is .true 
oi di.stribution according to  jobs or qualifications,  as well 
as of regional distribution.  At  a  given time,  the vaeant  jobs 
and their potential occupants do not exactly coincidco  There 
is also the  question,  however,  of whether  such frictiona1 
losses could not  be  lessened by  m~ans of  differe~tiated and 
well prepared  procedur~ and of whether necessary  chang~ovBr 
processes could  nc.~t  be as.aiated. 
As  a  result of the long crisis,  the une111ployed  are more 
diversified than in previous years  ..  There is hardly  a.  si.ngle 
group  of people,  sector or region which can escape  the  threat 
of  unemployment.  Mor~over, regional  and  company  employment 
markets are not  rigid;  even in a  recession many  people change 
jobs and many  transfers occur within companies.  Work-sharing 
measures would alao benefit  from  these  movem1!'llts  as  labo~lr 
requirements would  be passed along a  kind of relay and gradually 
adapted  ..  If this vas aceompanied  by  an active labour market 
policy (TetrainiLg,  aids to mobility,  etc  •• ),  transfer movP.ments 
could  be accelerated. 
On  the other hand,  particular qualifications may  be  scarce 
or tailored quite specifically to the needs of the  company~ 
Work-eharing measures might  mean  that  those in critical 
occupations will consolidate their negotiating positions,  for 
ex~mple on wages,  and gain  further advantages.  This dravback 
seems of less significance than the additional opportunities 
which work-sharing opens up,  not least for prob1e• groupe. 
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Of course,  they can only be  reintegrated gradually. It is 
to be  expected,  however,  that the very strict recruitment 
selection processes existing today would be  relaxed as a 
result of the  suddenly increased need  for  extra labour and 
that work-sharing measures would  give  preference to  such 
problem groups and  take  them  directly off the labour_market. 
Side-effects 
The  benefits of work-sharing measures would be  realised 
only if they resulted in an increase in the  number  of people 
employed.  This would be  the case if the new  jobs were  taken 
by the unemployed  or those currently inactive,  but would  not 
be  the  case if work-sharing led only to an  increase in 
"moonlighting"  or improved productivity. 
Thus,  permanent  staff might  work more  intensively and 
faster if working  hours were  shortened.  Absenteeism  could 
fall and  so contribute  to increased productivity;  willingness 
to work  overtime and  special shifts for  financial reasons 
might  grow.  The  employed  might  wish  to protect their rights 
and privileges against  newcomers.  Failure would  be  inevitable 
without  solidarity at  company  level. Staff and workers' 
representatives can contribute,  by responeible behaviour,  to 
the  success of work-sharing if,  for  instance,  they actively 
support  the adaptation of staffing plans to the  changed 
working conditions  (and changed  working hours). 
Entrants to the  labour market  from  the  inactive 
population,  such as married women,  students or those  who  have 
retired early,  cannot  be  excluded and  yet work-sharing measures 
(particularly an increase in part-time work)may  make  it more 
attractive to  them  again.  However,  we  should  not  encourage 
this whilst  unemployment  is so high.  Company  recruitment  policies 
could - as redundancy policy often does  today  - take  more  account 
of social factors and  perhaps give preference to the  unemployed. 
The  problem of illegal work  (moonlighting,  clandestine 
work)  is already an  immense  burden  on the  employment  situation 
in some  Member  States. Joint efforts will be  necessary to 
tackle those  factors which  encourage illegal working  and 
to ensure  that vork-sharing does not  aggravate it. 
./. - 11  - . 
Company  reaction~ 
The  impact  of work-sharing measures  depends not  only 
on  the  conduct  of the workers but also on  the  reactions of 
the employers.  The  opportunities for  cooperation are as 
numerous as  those  for  evasion.  A distinction must 
be  made  between  short  and  medium-term  reactions. 
The  stricter standards applied in personnel policy 
during  the recession have  already been mentioned in another 
context.  The  increased  demands  on  applicants strengthen  the 
normal barriers to access to certain careers or positions, 
such as age limits or  a  restriction to male  applicants only. 
Consideration should be  given to lowering these  requirements 
to a  reasonable level as part of the  work-sharing measures 
- perhaps  through  financial  incentives offered by  employment 
authorities. 
The  effect of work-sharing measures  could  be  strengthened 
by  personnel planning within companies.  Just as this flexible 
instrument  is used in times of crisis to reduce  the level of 
employment,  so  restructuring and  regrouping  should  now  facilitate 
the  engagement  of additional workers.  Apart  from  these  personnel 
policy decisions,  the  reaction of firms  to the  employment 
reserve  created by work-sharing measures  can vary  considerably. 
Taking  on  new  staff is just one  possibility and  not  always  the 
most  probable  one.  Many  companies,  rightly or  w~ongly, are 
afraid of the additional  obligations involved in the  re~ruitment 
of new  staff under  social and  labour legislation (e.g.  co-
management  thresholds,dieabled persons,  stagiaires,  etc ••• ). 
The  employers'  counter-reaction  - not  recruiting sufficient 
new  staff to fill the  places made  available  - is in no  way 
based  on ill-will,  but rather  on  justifiable economic 
considerations. This reaction will,  therefore,  take  different 
forms  according to the  work-sharing measure  concerned. It is 
largely but  not  exclusively orientated towards  the  prospective 
cost burden  for the  company.  As  will be  shown  in detail below, 
companies expect  to suffer particularly marked  disadvantages 
as a  result of the  reductions in working hours in the narrower 
sense  (shorter working  week,  longer holidays).  Most  investigations, 
therefore,  concentrate  on  the  problems  surrounding  these 
measures. 
Without  a  reaction on  the part  of the  employers,  the  jobs 
which become  vacant  and  the working  hours which are not  worked 
would lead to a  reduction in production and  services. This may 
fit neatly into the  employers'  plans where  sales expectations 
are unfavourable  or there is a.  general  shortage  of work 
./. ________________ _. ..............................  ______________________  ~------~~e~~ 
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(when,  for  example,  a  company  has announced  short-time working)i 
but  the effect  on  employment  would  be  practically nil. 
Reactions of this kind  cannot  be  ruled out  in sectors going 
through serious recession (coal-mining,  steel,  etc  •• ). 
In the  service industries this could also lead to a  reduction 
'in business and  opening hours. If the potential fall  in 
production is to be  counter-balanced,  companies have  at their 
disposal  a  wide  range  of possible  decisions,  differentiated 
according to short  and  medium-term measures.  The  most  important 
of these  would  be: 
•  The  transfer of production to locations which are  more 
suitable  from  the point  of view  of competition. or  course, 
a  step of this kind is not  made  overnight,  but  the work-sharing 
measures  may  constitute the  final  incentive. If work-sharing 
measures were  applied  on  a  broad international basis,  this 
sort of evasion would  be  made  still harder. 
•  Secondly,  increased productivity. This can be  brought 
about  by a  more  intensive rate of work  or by  the kind of 
measures which  are  frequently  lumped  together under the  heading 
of "rationalization",  that is,  reequipping with labour-saving 
technology  and production methods,  changes in working  hours 
and  shift systems,  and  improved  organization  of work.  Usually 
both approaches are applied.  They constitute the  constant 
driving  forces  of our  economic  development,  as companies 
constantly search for  the most  cost-effective production methods 
and  products in the interests of competitiveness. 
There is full agreement  that human  working capacity 
cannot  be  increased indefinitely.  Dead  periods and  increased 
efficiency play a  diminishing role in the level of working time 
now  reached.  On  the  other hand,  it is not  clear to what  extent 
reductions in working hours can be  absorbed  by  increasing 
productivity.  Many  hypotheses and  rough  formulas  are to be 
found  in the literature (•),  but  they all fail when  put  to 
the practical test. Too  many  factors have  to be  considered, 
such as the initial level of working hours,  the general  economic 
situation,  the automation of production processes,  the  use  of 
physical capital (continuously or in separateshifts)  or  even 
the basis on which wages are paid (on  a  time  basis or piece-work) • 
.  /. 
•)  Several studies are  quoted in F.  Eymard-Duvernay 
Lea  40  heures  1936  or  ••• 1980?  Economie  et Statistique,  No.  90, 
June 1977,  P•  15  ff and B. Seifert:  Zur  Kontroverse  um  die 
Arbeitezeitverkurzung,  (Controversy over reductions in working 
hours),  WSI-Bulletin 4/1977  and unpublished working  documents 
II/709/76 "Arbeitaumverteilung als Alternative  zur Arbeit&losigkeit" 
(Work-Sharing aa an alternative to unemploTment). 
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In view  of the  diversity of working conditions  (and working 
hours)  in different  sectors and  regions as described above, 
and  the  different  stag·es of their development,  any  genez:al 
hypothesis would  be  presumptious. 
To  begin with it should  be  remembered  that  the 
prospective gains in productivity brought  about  by reductions 
in working hours  can  scarcely be  quantified for  the  economy 
as a  whole  or for  entire sectors.  Ae  everyone  knows,  past 
experience  cannot  simply be  carried over to the present 
situation,  micro-level studies are  ruled  out here. 
•  Thirdly,  companies might  increase the efforts to 
develop  overtime·or special shifts. This possibility is 
restricted by  the  work-sharing measures  themselves,  and 
would  have  to play a  complementary role,  as it were. 
A very recent German  study into the  foreseeable  reactions 
of companies  to work-sharing measures is available. This 
large-scale  survey  of companies  (•)  admittedly identifies 
only hypothetical courses of action in respect  of several 
work-sharing measures.  With  this reservation,  it reveals 
considerable differences in behaviour in the  short  and 
medium-term  between  the  productive  and  administrative  sectors, 
between  the industrial and  service  sectors,  and  between large 
companies  and  smaller and  medium-sized  firms.  As  a  general 
rule,  however,  it was  discovered that,  of the  short-term 
reactions~ involving new  recruitment,  most  employers 
preferred to introduce  overtime in production areas and 
rationalization in administration.  In order to achieve  the 
greatest possible effect  on  employment,  therefore,  it would 
be  necessary to develop different strategies even at  company 
level. 
Practical application 
The  theoretical concept  applied to the  economy  aa  a  whole, 
that  the  required  output  can be  obtained by means  of variations 
in the  proportional input  of  the  various factors (at least 
within certain limits),  cannot  be readily translated into 
practice. The  relationship of capital and labour is usually 
more  rigid at company level. It is largely determined by  the 
production process and  the capital equipment available. 
./. 
(*)  see  IFO-speed  service 26/197?  (Institute for  Economic  Research) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------~--.~-~~ 
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Naturally,  the  numbers  employed vary according to the 
nature  of the  physical assets (e.g. level of development 
of the  machinery),  and  this relationship is not  always  fixed. 
In the  service  sector these  relationships are  often much  less 
marked.  Some  production methods,  however,  such as assembly-
line work,  allow no  discretion in the allocation of capital. 
If work-sharing measures "release"  only  a  few  working hours 
and  not  full-time  workers,  the  recruitment  of new  labour 
would  have  to be  coupled with new  investment.  The  production 
machinery would  have  to be  adapted to  the  shorter period of 
time  during which workers are available.  Of  course,  many 
·companies are  deterred  from  an  expansion of capacity at 
present because  of existing under-use  of capacity and higher 
capital expenditure.  They  would  try to adopt  one  of the 
evasiYe  strategies described above. 
It should be  said by  way  of qualification,  however, 
that  even this objection does not  quite  correspond to reality. 
Assembly-line  work  i~.practised  b~,  at most,  no  more  than 
5  ~ of companies  in the Member  States.  Some  professions, 
typified by  teachers or sales staff,  have  virtually no 
connection with physical assets. Finally,  companies in the 
most  diverse  sectors,  particularly in production,  when 
"compelled"  to introduce  short-time working,  have  shown  an 
amazing ability to adapt.  This flexibility must  also represent 
an advantage  in the  ease  of work-sharing measures. 
Another claim,  often heard in this connection,  is also 
only partly true. This is the  theory that the  beneficial 
effects of work-sharing measures  on  employment  will  only be 
felt where  a  company  exceeds  a  certain minimum  size  - for. 
example,  reductions in working hours  by  one  hour  from  40 
at present  to 39  would  only be  possible in companies with 
at least 39  employees.  Applied  to the  economy  as a  whole, 
the majority of companies would not  need  to reduce working 
hours at all, as most  firma  are  small  or medium-sized. 
In the case  of more  substantial reductions in working 
hours,  this theoretical minimum  size  falls rapidlyo  Much  more 
important,  however,  is the  fact  that  in a  company  many  functions 
.may  be  so vital that  even  a  partial reduction in the  reserve 
of labour (or working  time)  makes  extra labour urgently 
necessary.  This is always  so in the  case  of pre-determined 
products or services (courses of instruction,  round  the  clock 
service etc  •• ).  Of course,  with very small businesses there is 
a  danger that  the  functions "released" in terms of time will 
be  taken over  by  the  owner of the  business or  a  member  of his 
family.  Their working conditions would  thus,  in certain 
circumstances,  become  considerably worse. 
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Against  the  minimum  size  argument,  finally,  it can be 
pointed  out  that  the  effect of work-sharing measures  on 
employment  can also be  of a  defensive  nature  - that in the 
case  of "marginal  functions"  otherwise inevitable redundancies 
may  still be  avoided.  The  gross movements  on  the  labour market 
are  known  to be  substantially greater than the measurement 
of the registered number  of unemployed indicates.  The  number 
of people  entering and  leaving the  labour  market  is between 
three and.  five  times  the registered number,  depending  on 
the  general  economic  situation and  the  work  of the  employment 
offices. Fewer  redundancies  thus lead to a  reduction in the 
number  of new  unemployed  and at the  same  time  ease  the 
labour market. 
Cost  effectiveness 
The  most  powerful  argument  against  the  effectiveness 
of work-sharing measures are  the cost burdens  they entail. 
The  British Chancellor of the Exchequer,  Mr.  Healey,  as 
President  of the last Tripartite Conference,  emphasized  these 
problema as the nucleus of the  proposed Commission  studies 
on  work-sharing.  Clearly,  they  cannot  be  considered in 
isolation  from  the  other problems of work-sharing as there 
is interaction between  them.  On  the  level of the  economy 
as a  whole,  critics of work-sharing  fear  a  deterioration in 
comparative .costs and  with it a  weakening  in international 
competition position. 
The  legitimate  fear that  certain Member  States will be  forced 
into unfavourable  competitive  and  cost  positions by uncoordinated 
work-sharing measures  would  be  reduced if such measures were  taken 
at Community level.  A  possible  problem is that  the  competitive 
position might alter not  aomuch within the Community,  but  vis-a-vis 
non-member  countries.  Additional cost  burdens  must  therefore  be  kept 
as  low  as possible.  Moreover,  cur .initiatives will become  known  · 
outside  of the Community,  and  encourage  corresponding action 
in other countries or strengthen existing trends. 
If we  begin with general observations then,  according 
to the  type  of measure  involved,  different  effects can  be 
distinguished in relation to  : 
individual  incomes 
- the  tax burden  on  the working population 
- the  cost  structure of the  individual  firm 
- the  competitive position of the sector 
- the  social security systems,  and 
- public  expenditure. 
Broadly  speaking,  these  financial effects might  also be 
subdivided into "private" and  "public" costs,  which aa  a  general 
rule  counter-balance  each other  - without,  admittedly, 
necessarily balancing out  exactly. That is,  if coats arise 
on  one  aide 9  the  financial  burden  on  the  other  side  can  be 
expected  to ease.  In concrete  terms,  because  of the positive effect 
of work-sharing measures  on  employment,  the  expenditure  on 
unemployment  payments  would  fall. 
./. . I 
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Several attempts have  been made  to carry  out  a 
cost  - benefit  calculation  for  the  economy  as a  whole. 
It was  relatively simple  to establish the  potential benefit 
to  the public  expenditure  and  social security systems. 
It would  be  in inverse proportion to the  costs of the 
unemployed  placed in work,  that is,  to the  total  sum  of 
unemployment  benefit,  family assistance,  losses in taxation 
and  social security contributions,  and  the national insurance 
payments  taken over by  the State {•). As  our earlier remarks 
showed,  the probable  effects on  employment  cannot  be  clearly 
quantified,  however,  so that  the  calculation of "public  benefit" 
can only reasonably be  made  ~or certain hypotheses or 
threshold values. 
Nevertheless,  we  have  not carried out  a  calculation 
of this kind at Community level,  firstly,  because  the  effects 
of work-sharing measures  on  employment  differ not  only with 
the  measure  involved according  to sector or  occupational 
group,  but also according to the  Member  State concerned,  and, 
secondly,  because it is even harder,  if not  impossible,  to 
ascertain the private cost of work-sharing measures.  The 
changes in income  and  personnel costs would  be  easiest. to 
establish in this connection,  although  the differences between 
the Member  States of the Community  are again considerable  (••). 
On  the  other hand,  it is impossible to establish the 
costs arising for  undertakings as a  result of company  agreements 
(voluntary  supplementary payments)  or  of the  technical problems 
or production created by new  recruitment  described above. 
These  include  new  investment  or other changes in physical 
assets. It cannot  be  determined  in advance  how  many  and  which 
companies would  try to absorb  the effects of work-sharing 
measures  on  employment  by  increasing productivity,  which would 
enable  them  to reduce  accordingly the  coats connected with 
these measures. 
./. 
( * )  In Germany,  an  average  annual  expenditure  of DM  18,500 was 
calculated for  19?6;  in Belgium,  for  a  married industrial worker 
(income  BFns390,000),  an annual  expenditure  of BFrs 428;000  was 
calculated  for  1975.  The  difference  can be  explained by  the 
differing State grants to the social security system,  and 
especially by  the  reference  figures  {average  unemployed  person 
as opposed to a  former  industrial worker). 
(••}  The  average personnel costs for  one  industrial worker  according 
the Community's figures  on  labour costa for  1975,  taking  the 
following  three cases as examples,  was  : 
to 
B  1550  (hours worked per year)  X  5.5  Eur  (labour costs per h) 
F  1862  (  "  "  "  " 
)  X  4.1  Eur  (  "  " 
11  ") 
NL  1661  (  "  "  "  " 
}  X  5-7 Eur  (  tt  1t  "  ") - 17  -
There  is a  danger in calculations of this sort, 
moreover,  in that they  deduce  too  much  from  the current 
state of the  economy.  Work-sharing measures will always 
. affect  demand  throughout  the  economy  and  hence  also production. 
A final point  :  even if it could be  proved  that the 
private costs exceed  the public relief,  this alone  would  not 
argue  against work-sharing measures.  At  least as important 
are  the possible  reduction in social pressures and political 
tensions,  which would  accompany  the  fall in unemployment. 
The  question  of  financing work-sharing must  be  treated 
in a  broader context.  For  the  individual it is a  matter of 
deciding between  income,  leisure time  and  job  opportunities. 
If the  individual obtains more  leisure,  which  marmean 
shorter working  hours  or retirement  from  working life,  he 
must  expect  sacrifices in income  and  he potentially increases 
the  job  opportunities of otherso  This possibility does  not 
appeal  to everyone  and  therefore it should,  as  far as possible, 
not  be  imposed  on  people.  Even if this decision is taken, 
however,  it should not  involve  a  one-sided allocation of 
costs. Absolute losses of income  for  those  in employment  through 
reductions .in working  hours are not  desirable.  The  sacrifice 
in income  on  retirement  from  working life must  not  be  set 
too high,  otherwise  the work-sharing measures  become  less 
attractive and  a  telling effec-t  on  employment  will not  be 
achieved. 
It is equally wrong  to assume  a  one-sided acceptance 
of costa by  undertakingso  Excessive  cost burdens increase 
rationalisation measures  and  other attempts to  increase 
productivity (organisation of work,  rate of work,  etc •• ). 
Consequently,  they lead  employment  policy into a  blind alley. 
In view  of the high inflation rates it is also undesirable 
to  t~ansfer costs to prices.  Nor is it desirable,  in the 
present uncertain  economic  situation,  to  demand  that  dwindling 
company profits should  finance  work-sharing measureo,  as this 
would  further affect investment  prospects and  thwart  other 
efforts to promote  growth. 
Apart  from  the  individual assessments of work-sharing 
measures which  follow,  the  basic principle ·for a  positive 
effect  on  employment  policy might  be  that work-sharing 
requires the distribution ot the  costs involved,  which must 
be  determined according to the  type  of measure  concerned 
and  the actual situation between individual,  company  and 
State. 
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Partial transfer of costs to the State or the  social 
security systems is justified by  the  fact  that it is in 
their interests to keep  unemployment  as low as possible. 
The  public  expenditure not  only loses the direct subsidies 
and  tax revenue;  falling  demand  and  recovery  programmes 
have  to be  contended with and  financed  in the  economic 
policy field,  and loss of qualification and  personal distress 
compensated  for in the  social field. It would  be  useful,  then, 
if the State would  "subsidize" work-sharing measures out  of 
the  resources accruing to it from  the  effect on  employment 
(fewer benefits increased tax revenue). Financial participation 
of this kind could  take  different  forms  according  to  the  type 
of measure  and will also go  to different recipients. 
Some  consideration would also have  to be  given to 
means  of bridging the  time lag between the  incurring of 
private costs and  -generally after some  delay- the  easing 
of public  expenditure.  Since this "subsidization" might  take 
the  form  not  of direct  payments,  but,  for  example,  of tax 
incentives,  the administrative problems (including avoidance 
of accumulative  effects)  need not necessarily be  a  cause  of 
delay. Finally, it may  be  mentioned in passing that  the State 
9an make  a  direct contribution to increasing employment  by 
making  more  part-time  jobs available. 
Labour market  rigidities 
The  final objection in terms  of employment  policy 
to be  examined is the  theory concerning the  extent  to which 
work-sharing measures adversely affect the  flexibility of 
the  labour market.  There are three main  fears here  : 
•  Firstly, it is claimed that work-sharing is a  form  of 
rationing which makes disproportionate  inroads into companies' 
freedom  of movement  as regards their decision-making.  Company 
personnel planning must,  however,  remain  flexible  to allow 
for appropriate  and  rapid  reactions to unforeseeable 
fluctuations in demand.  "Rationing"  the labour reserve,  it 
is alleged,  limits companies'  autonomy as  regards investment. 
These criticisms are  directed in general at the 
protective provisions of social policy. Coa1panies  are  only 
free  up  to the point where  they come  up against  the protective 
interests of the  work  force.  To  avoid conflict between  the 
tvo sets of claims,  work-sharing measures  should take account 
of the differing interests involved. 
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Secondly,  work-sharing measures are alleged to  be  too 
closely tailored to the  economic  situation of the  moment. 
The  very pessimistic point  to the  demographic-basis of the 
increase in the  labour reserve,  and  fear  that  the relief 
effects of certain work-sharing measures,  especially marked 
at the  outset  (such as raising the  school-leaving age, 
lowering  retirement  age)  could not  be  repeated if the 
economic  situation worsened still further.  More  optimistic 
critics predict  a  renewed  shortage  of labour in the  event 
of an  economic  boom  in the  next  few  years. 
Neither line of thought  corresponds to the Community 
standpoint  adopted  in the  fourth medium-term  programme  and 
at the last Tripartite Conference.  The  Community is striving 
towards  a  constant  improvement  in growth and  a  gradual 
reduction in unemployment.  Since  only  a  medium-term  easing 
of the  employment  situation is expected initially,  work-
sharing measures  would  supplement  policies aimed at promoting 
growth.  The  more  flexible  the  form  which  these  instruments 
take,  the  easier it would  be  to adapt  them  to the  future 
situation,  too. 
This  statement leads,  however,  to the  third fear, 
which is that work-sharing would'create  a  social situation 
which  would  remain  fixed  in the  long-term.  The  present 
intervention in the  workings  of the  labour market,  resulting 
from  the  economic  situation,  are,  it is said,  in general 
irreversible,  because  of their social significance.  We  know 
that  the  trend of the  labour  supply  in the Community  reverses 
after 1983,  admittedly with differing patterns in the  Member 
States. It is not  possible to predict the  co~rse the  economy 
will  take  in this phase  and  the  changes in the  development 
of productivity.  From  the  experience  of previous years,  however,  it 
can be  deduced  that the  economy  has  a  great  capacity for  adaptation. 
To  avoid  overtaxing the  economic  system,  however,  we  should  go  first 
for  those  work-sharing mea·sures  which  do  not  involve  any  permanent 
limitation on  the labour supply. 
PRINCIPLES  FOR  ACTION 
From  the  foregoing  analysis it has beeome  clear that 
work-sharing does  not  of itself guarantee  an  improvement  in 
the  employment  situation. Different  measures  have  different 
effects on  employment,  the  extent  of which  depends  on  the 
attention paid to a  number  of factors. Certain courses of 
action help towards the desired  end  or reduced  unemployment, 
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others could result in an additional burden on  economic 
resources and undesirable effects on growth and price 
stability.  A work-sharing strategy will be more  successful 
if it prevents  : 
- blanket measures blocking the  road to individual 
decisions or agreements; 
- financial burdens being imposed  on  one  side only; 
- market  force being excessively blocked; 
interference with other policies aimed at improving 
the economic  situation. 
From  discussions held so far,  a  number  of basic 
principles are emerging which may  be  of great  value  in the 
application of work-sharing measures.  They are based on 
general  economic  and  social objectives,  recognized br both 
sides of industry and political leaders alike. These principles 
are of prime  importance and  should be  incorporated in the 
practical development  of the work-sharing measures and be 
given concrete  form  accordingly. 
1.  It must  be  ensured that free  choice  of  employment  is 
not  restricted. Statutory or collectively negotiated 
reductions of working hours or working life should 
leave  scope  for  individual decision,  except where  this 
interferes with social protection. 
2.  Economic  decision-making and  the opportunities for 
individual choiqe  should be  as flexible as possible. 
This flexibility is valid up  to the point where it 
appears no longer economically  justifiable. It is 
essential to  ensure that additional costs are kept 
as low as possible. 
3·  Special priority should be  given to groups which are 
particularly under-privileged as regards their working 
conditions and  to groups which  suffer especially  from 
the  scourge  of unemployment.  This will require additional 
efforts to humanize  working life,  combined with improved 
job opportunities. 
4.  Work-sharing measures must be assessed in terms of their 
combined  effect. This assessment  should not  be restricted 
to labour market  aspects,  but  should  examine  the 
relationship of such measures with general economic, 
structural and social policies. 
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ASSESSMENT  OF  SPECIFIC  MEASURES 
In  the  remarks  made  ao  far,  work-sharing has been treated 
as a  strategy rather than as a  specific  instrument  of employment 
or social policy.  Thus,  generalizations could not always  be 
avoided,  and individual  questions were  completely ignored. 
The  following  assessment is more  closely concerned with 
specific measures.  The  arguments  for  and  against,  which 
have  already been considered,  will not  be  examined again 
individually,  but  supplementary or insufficiently illuminated 
problems will.be discussed. 
The  types of measure  selected are those  which,  despite 
controversial assessments  from  governments  and  the  two  sides 
of industry,  have  a  good  chance  of being implemented. 
Shortening the working week 
This is the best known  and  at the  same  time  the  most 
controversial  of  the work-sharing measures.  It defies simple 
assessment,  as  the  differences in working  hours in various 
Member  States,  sectors and  trades are  exceptionally great 
(see  above,  page 5  ). Thus,  the Council Recommendation  of 
17th June  1975  concerning  the  application of the basic 40-hour 
week  and  four  weeks'paid  annual  holiday,  while it has been 
extensively  implemented,  has not  been incorporated in all 
collective agreements.  A long-term  trend towards  shorter 
working  hours is common  to all sectors,  however. 
The  point  of departure  for  a  further reduction in 
working  hours is difficult to establish,  as a  distinction 
must  be  made  between statutory,  collective-agreement-based, 
paid  and  actual working  time.  To  achieve  any  effects at all 
on  employment,  the  hours effectively worked  must  be  reduced. 
These  depend  on  company  requirements and  individual motivation. 
Collective agreements  define  the  limits to overtime  and 
part-time work;  the  transition  from  legal to illegal working 
hours is defined  in legislation. 
All  the  empirical  data points to considerable differences 
between agreed  working  hours  and  hours worked.  From  observations 
dating back  further,  it also emerges  that  reductions in the 
paid working  hou~s lead with a  certain delay  to shorter 
effective working  hours.  This experience is common  to all 
Member  States. 
Only  short  reference is made  to the  importance  of modified 
working  time  for social life. The  existing infrastructure and 
services could be  better used with  a  flexible  organisation of working 
time.  For  the  individual  there  could be  a  better balance  betwe 0 ~ the 
requirements of work,  leisure,  family,  and participation in aocial 
and cultural activities. 
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Overtime  operates as the  safety-valve  for  shorter 
paid working hours.  If it were  cut off,  collective-agreement-
based working  time  and  effective working  time  would  follow 
a  more  closely synchronized  development.  To  what  extent  a 
reduction would  create problems is still being investigated 
separately. 
In the  final analysis,  the  question as to whether 
marked  reductions in working  hours help or not  in the present 
labour market crisis always centres round  variously assessed 
cost  factors.  What  necessary or acceptable  sacrifices of 
income  should the worker make  in return  for  reduced  working 
hours?  The  two  basic  positions are as  follows  : 
1.  Reductions in working hours without  an  increase in 
income  (compensatory  wage  allowance).  This would  mean  a  fall 
in net  income  for  those  in employment.  Assuming  that  companies 
undertake  new  recruitments corresponding to the lost working 
hours,  their costs would  be  increased in the  main  by  only 
three  factors:  firstly,  by  personnel costs linked not  to  the 
duration of work  but  to  the  number  of employees,  such as 
subsidized meals,  fringe  benefits,  etc •• ;  secondly,  . 
by  the  need. for  new  equipment,  as increases in staff could 
make  new  investment  necessary  for  technical  reasons  - as has 
already been  mentioned,  this rigid relationship between work 
and capital by  no  means  always exists;  thirdly,  the additional 
obli~ations (mentioned  on  page  11)  resulting  from  passing 
thresholds of numbers  of  employees  (10,  50,  10  •••  employees). 
In contrast  to this,  however,  there are cost  advantages 
which  should not  be  underestimated.  Experience  shows  that 
any  reduction in working hours is accompanied  by  increases 
in productivity {although thie may  only  occur after changes 
in the  organization of work).  After a  brief period  of 
adaptation,  those  newly  recruited will reach  a  level of 
productivity similar to that  of the staff already  employed 
in the  company,  with the result that production is able  to 
continue  without  interruption.  In addition,  account  should 
be  taken  of the  fact  that as a  rule  new  staff get  a  · 
considerably lower wage  than  employees  of standing,  so that 
some  profit can  be  derived  from  this  turnov~r of labour. 
While  this would  save  companies the  task of altering their 
production plans or price policy,  it is certainly not 
abceptable  to the workers  and  their representatives. Its 
rejection is based  on  the  experience  - although under 
completely different  economic  circumstances  - that  reductions 
in working  hours can  be carried out  with compensatory wage 
allowances.  Moreover,  marked  reductions in  demand  and  economies 
would  accompany  the real sacrifices in income  and  constitute 
an undesirable  obstacle to the more  important  process of 
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2.  Reductions in working hours with  ~compensatory 
wage  allowance.  This implies a  proportional wage  increase 
for  the reduced  working hours and  thus a  constant  income 
for  the  employee.  For  the  company,  the  same  advantages and 
disadvantages would  apply as in the previous case,  plus 
the  coats arising  from  the  compensatory  wage  allowance. 
Assuming,  once  again,  that  companies fill the  free  working 
hours  entirely with  new  recruitments,  then  a  corresponding 
increase in labour unit  coats would  result.  In order to 
sell their now  dearer products,  the  companies  would  face 
two alternatives  :  to reduce their profit-margins or to 
increase  the  selling pricee  The  first course  of action 
leads to redistribution of  income  and  a  fall in investments, 
which  in the present  economic  situation would  certainly 
not  be  desirable and  would  dash all further  hopes  of growth. 
The  second  course  must  also be  assessed unfavourably  from 
the  point  of  view  of the  economy  as  a  whole.  It would 
rekindle inflation and  have  an  adverse  effect  on  the 
competi  ti.ve  position of the  firma  concerned. 
It would  be  more  realistic to assume  that  companies 
will  absorb  some  of the  free  working  hours  by  means  of an 
increase in productivity,  especially where  company  organization 
will have  to be  changed with an  increase  in staff. This 
correspondingly  reduces  the  effect  on  employment,  of course. 
To  take  the  extreme  case,  an  increase  in productivity 
sufficient to offset  the  reduction in working  hours would 
mean,  all other things being  equal,  constant  labour unit 
costs,  but  would  be  a  complete  failure  from  the  point  of 
view  of  employment  policy. 
As  we  have  already indicated in the  general  remarks, 
the extent to which  increases in productivity can be 
achieved  depends  on  many  factors.  Here  are  a  few  extra 
details.  An  important  role is clearly played by  the use 
made  of  the  company's  capacity.  At  an average  of 80%  for 
.industry,  this is at present  very  low.  If no  other factors 
are  involved,  the  effect  on  employment will  thus be  rather 
insignificanto  Increases in productivity can also be 
achieved if the  company  takes the  reductions in working 
hours as an  opportunity to change  over to shift work.  (•) 
The  economic  advantages  and  the  physiological and  social 
disadvantages  of shift  work  are  well  known.  A reduction in  th~ 
length of shifts could lead  to  the  taking  on  of additional staff, 
provided that  enough  workers  can  be  found  who  are  prepared to  do 
shift work. 
./. 
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The  success of the  reductions in working hours is 
therefore alao  dependent  on th•ir extent. The  extent  must  be 
differentiated according to the  situation in difterent sectors. 
It is not necessairly the  case that  the  most  drastic  reduction 
in working  time  takes place in the  sectors with the longest 
working  time  which are  often the  weakest  ones.  In general, 
only a  major  step offers any change  of increasing both 
productivity and  employment.  To  do this,  a  certain balance  must 
be  found  between the  extreme positions described,  on  the  one~ 
hand productivity increases,  on  the  other hand  wage  losses. 
Financial assistance  from  the State could pake  a  positive 
contribution here. It is justified because,  as unemployment 
is reduced,  expenditure is saved and additional revenue  can 
be  expected. It could help to reduce  the  gap between  the costs 
covered by  increases in productivity and  those arising  from 
compensatory wage  allowance. 
A certain gap will nevertheless remain.  The  workers 
too  should therefore make  a  contribution by  reducing their 
wage  expectations in return for  shorter working hours. 
Present wage-restraint is not  asked of them,  but  the 
moderation in future  wage  settlements.  More  jobs for  the 
unemployed would  then mean  further and  only relatively 
curtailed rises in real wag8s  for those already employed. 
The  precise distribution of financial burdens  among  the 
various parties concerned will,  as before,  be  the result 
of a  political process. 
Extension of annual holidays 
For the  current discussion on labour market  policy it is 
largely irrelevant whether the  extension of annual holidays 
takes the  form  of longer holiday leave  or an additional 
period of training leave.  In both cases,  statutory provisions 
and  a  collective agreements  vary  from  one  Member  State to 
another.  There is a  general  trend  towards longer holidays, 
which has tended to accelerate during the recession. 
The  currently agreed extensions are in general  small, 
gradual  improvements.  Abrupt  changes,  e.g.  that  from  weekdays 
to working  days,  mostly  took place in the  fairly distant 
past. For the  same  reasons as in the case  of the shorter 
working week,  a  major.etep ia important  for the  success 
of the  shorter working year.  A  day-by-day extension of holiday 
entitlement,  while it stimulates productivity,  probably 
creates hardl7 any new  job possibilities. 
,/. if  1;  4  a~  t 
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The  cost  problema  of longer holidays are  very  si~ilar 
•I  to those  of the shorter working  week,  and  the  same  bas1c 
objections apply  regarding employment  structure and 
application at  company level.  The  already mentioned  IFO 
survey of companies in Germany  states that an extension of 
annual  holiday by 5  - 8  working  days is assessed by 
companies  as  being no  different  on  average  from  a  reduction 
of the working week  by  two hours.  The  employers'  reactions 
to such  a  measure,  and  thus the effects on  employment 
policy,  were  substantially the  same  - apart  from  the  fact 
that  temporary staff would  be  required in the  event  of 
longer holidays. 
In several Member  States,  opinion polls and trade 
union  demands  for  a  minimum  of six weeks'  holiday a  year 
indicate that workers would prefer a  yearly as opposed to 
a  weekly reduction.  One  or two  further problems  should 
be  considered briefly in connection with an extension of 
holidays. 
We  are not  referring to adaptation problems which 
might  be  experienced  by  the  worker after a  fairly long 
interruption of working life. This problem is only acute 
after absence  from  work  for  several months  or years,  as in 
the  case  of leave  for personal  reasons,  which is admittedly 
only available in the Civil Service. 
We  are referring to the problems which  reduce the 
level of employment.  Many  companies  order compulsory closures 
within which holidays must  be  taken.  Although  an extension 
of the  closure period means  a  certain loss of production, 
this can be  more  easily absorbed by increasing productivity 
than by having  employees  spread their holidays over the  year. 
Moreover~ the holiday bonus granted in many  companies 
·increases the costs of any reduction of working  time 
(compensatory wage  allowance,  fringe benefits,  investments 
and  internal change-overs),  which  must  be  taken into 
consideration in collective negotiations. 
Reetriction of overtime  and  special shifts 
The  restriction of overtime  and  special shifts ·should 
be  regarded as a  measure  complementary to the  reductions in 
working hours.  As  a  rule,  overtime and  special shifts qualify 
for  extra pay and if companies  switch over to  them  as a 
reaction to reductions in working hours,  labour costa increase. 
At  the  same  time  they reduce  the effect  on  employment.  Since,  after 
a  certain wage  level,  social security contributions increase less 
quickly than wages,  it is often cheaper  for  a  firm,  despite  having 
to pay  overtime  premiums,  to resort to overtime  rather than to 
the  recruitment  of additional  workers. 
..; . --------------------------------....  -------~~~---~  ............  _....,; .... 
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Overtime is customary both in recessions and  in 
prosperous times,  although to a  differing extent. It serves 
the  company  as a  ~uffer against  fluctuations in the  demand 
for their goods  and  services.  In spite of its great 
importance,  statistics on  the  subject are unsatisfactory. 
Regular  surveys are carried out  only within the  commercial 
sector and  the construction industry. Estimates put  the 
proportion of overtime  to working  time at between 3  and 
5  per cent  overall. Calculations in Great Britain,  where 
a  large proportion of workers  do  overtime,  show  that,  in 
approximately half of all sectors of industry,  the  full-
time  equivalent  (40- hour week)  of the overtime worked 
exceeds the registered unemployment  figures  (for all workers).  (•) 
The  IFO  survey of German  companies  discovered in Spring 1977 
that barely 40 ~ of companies regularly used  overtime in 
production,  an average  of 2  to 3  hours per worker. 
Overtime  could be restricted in three ways;  by making 
it more  expensive,  by  obligatory free-time  in lieu (as is 
frequently customary in high-level  jobs)  or by  a  ban  on 
overtime  above  realistic upper limits. 
A general ban  on  overtime is,  in our view,  out  of 
the  question.  It would  mean  too  severe a  curtailment  of 
company  flexibility and  result in grave  organisational 
problems,  delivery delays or a  fall in orders  for the  companies 
involved.  On  the other hand,  the upper limits and  exceptions 
from  normal  working  time  provided  for in the statutory rules 
or collective agreements  on working  hours  should  be  examined 
and,  if necessary,  be  revised downwards.  In addition, 
attempts could be  made  at company  and collective level 
to encourage  the  compensation of overtime  with  free  time 
in lieu rather than  cash payments.  This proposal will not 
meet  with the universal agreement  of the  labour force,  who 
frequently  regard  overtime bonuses or special shifts as a 
traditional part  of their wage.  Joint action should therefore 
continue to be  encouraged. 
The  methods  described could  reduce  permanent  overtime 
and  thus ease  the cost burden to some  extent and create 
room  for  new  jobs.  The  collective agreements could also be 
modified according to the general  economic  situation,  which 
could avoid a  long-term  fixing of the  duration of working 
time.  Further _increasing the cost  of overtime presents more 
problems.  Should all overtime be  made  more  expensive,  or 
merely non-essential  overtime?  How  should  such  a  distinction 
be  made  and  enforced?  Increasing the  cost  b7 raising the 
(•)  see Annex,  table 9· 
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workers'  wages  could increase the latter's motivation 
to take  on extra work  rather than lead to new  recruitments. 
A tax to be  paid to the State,  which  would  be  used  for 
the creation of new  jobs,  would  create considerable 
administrative problems and  in the  final analysis would 
yield  very sizable financial  resources. This  seems to us 
to be  the less satisfactory solution. 
Expansion of part-time  employment 
This problem  area suffers  from  considerable difficulties 
of definition.  The  difficulties will increase if further 
reductions in the working week  become  necessary.  In the 
broadest  sense,  flexible part-time  employment  has advantages 
for both labour-market  and  social policy.  The  individual 
would  be  free  to accept  reduced working hours  (with 
corresponding sacrifices in income)  on  a  temporary,  seasonal 
or permanent basis,  or to pursue  only occasional occupations. 
In the  narrower  sence,  part-time  employment  means  a  regular 
and  voluntary occupation with  fewer  working hours  than is 
customary  (unlike  short-time working).  Some  Member  States 
have  laid down  a  maximum  number  of hours,  which  can  however 
vary according to social requirements •. 
Because  of the variety of definitions,  exact statistics 
cannot  be  obtained.  According to the  follow-up  to the 
Community  Labour Force  Sample  Survey,  approximatel~ 
9.2 million were  in part-time  employment  in the  narrower 
sense  in  197S·  (•)  In the Sixties there was  an  overall 
tendency  for  the  number  of people  in part-time  employment 
to rise,  both in  abso~ute and  in relative terms. 
The  advantages and  disadvantages of part-time working 
are  exceptionally controversial.  Only  a  few  can  be  mentioned 
here;  more  detailed studies must  be carried out later. 
(•)  The  percentage  of part-time workers in the labour  force 
varies considerably  from  one  Member  State to another 
- from  4  ~ in Ireland to 17 ~ in Denmark.  In the case of 
women,  who  are greatly overrepresented everywhere,  the  spread 
is from  10 ~ in Italy to 41  - in the United Kingdom. 
./. L 
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A salient point is the  increasing flexibility for 
employee  and  employer alike.  The  individual is better able 
to adapt  his working hours to his personal preferences and 
requirements,  and  the  company  can increase its labour force 
and  make  better use  or its capacity. Considerable dis-
advantages are involved,  however  : 
- The  social protection of those  in part-time  employment 
today  frequently lags far behind that  of the 
full-time workers. 
- Their commitment  to and integration into the  company 
is in general less marked.  There is a  tendency 
to treat  them  as marginal  groups and,  if necessary, 
to dismiss them  more  readily. 
- There is a  danger that  they will be  forced into 
peripheral  jobs or will  find their career prospects 
reduced. 
- People in part-time  employment  are more  prepared 
to accept  inadequate working conditions.  Internal 
tensions can then arise within the  company. 
- Part-time workers mean  higher labour and administrative 
costs. 
- The  employment  of part-time workers means  that 
the threshold values laid  down  in certain laws 
for  various rights or duties (eo-determination, 
safety standards,  employment  of the  seriously disabled) 
are more  rapidly exceeded.  This results in further 
additional costs. 
This.list is not  exhaustive. It is merely intended 
to throw light  on  the problems  involved.  It can  be  assumed 
that  a  considerable  number  of unemployed persons,  especially 
women,  are  only looking  for part-time work  (according to 
German  statistics this applies to over a  third of women). 
New  possibilities for part-time work  would  certainly benefit 
them.  Many  of those  in employment,  too,  (p~esumably married 
women  and  older people in particular)  would  welcome  the 
offer of shorter working hours in the  form  of part-time 
working.  On  the  other hand,  additional people,  for whom 
the  present  arrangements are not  sufficiently attractive, 
would  undoubtedl7 enter the  labour market  looking for work  • 
.  /. - .!!A4  ·4!! 
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As  things stand,  therefore,  an  expansion  of part-time 
employment  can only be  recommended  with considerable 
reservations.  Before  a  general  expansion  takes place, 
additional analyses of jobs and  the  labour market  are 
required.  The  difficult process of eliminating social 
disadvantages  for  those in part-time employment  must  be 
begun,  and  the  employment  offices must  organize their 
activities accordingly.  Governments  could set  a  good  example 
by  reviewing the provisions contained in the Civil Service 
regulations.  Only after such changes  in addition to the  desired 
flexibility oould  be  achieved  a  real improvement  in the 
employment  situation. 
Changes in the retirement  age 
At  first glance,  a  change  in the retirement  age  seems 
an attractive proposition,  as it is aimed  directly at  the 
employment  problems  of a  group which,  in times  of economic 
crisis,  is scarcely able  to  improve  its position  on  the 
labour market  by its own  efforts. This measure  however  poses 
health a.nd  social problems,  if the  transition  from  working 
life to retirement is compulsory or insufficiently prepared 
(retirement  shock). It could also place an additional 
burden  on  .g~vernment finances,  wbieh are already under strain. 
In view  of the present level of taxation,  a  further increase 
in taxes and  social contributions would  not  be  without 
its problems.  On  the  other hand,  it is public  funds  which 
benefit  from  a  reduction in unemployment,  although the  savings 
could  be  lower than  the  new  financial  burdens. 
Nevertheless,  two  Member  States,  Belgium  and France, 
have  recently introduced a  lower retirement  age  as a 
deliberate means  of combatting  employment  problema.  In 
Belgium,  in companies  employing 20 people  or more,  men  may 
choose  early retirement at 60  and  women  at 55,  provided that 
unemployed  people  under 30 are  taken  on  in their place. 
Up  to November  1977,  32.000 people  had retired in this wayy 
The  scheme  is subject  to a  time-limit,  which  may  be  extended, 
and  therefore makes  allowances  for  misgivings concerning 
irreversible social measures.  In France,  too,  a  partial 
reversibility is provided  for.  Specific  features of the French 
scheme  include a  total ban  on  work  during  free  time 
- in contrast to regular pensioners  - and provision for  early 
retirement at 60 with a  guaranteed  income  of 70  ~ of the 
previous salary.  The  scheme  would  appear to be  used less 
than was  originall7 estimated. 
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These  recent  schemes contrast with those  implemented 
since 1973  in Germany,  where  a  pension can be  applied for 
between the  ages  of 63  and 67  and  may  even be  combined with 
small additional earnings.  On  average,  two  thirds of those 
eligible apply  for  an  early pension. 
These practical examples  shows that,  in terms of 
employment  policy,  the  success of such measures  depends  on 
concomitant  circumstances.  The  more  rigid the  individual 
restrictions (and  especially the  financial burden),  the' 
weaker the  response,  and thus the effect on  employment,  is 
likely to be. It is preferable that  schemes  should be as 
flexible as possible,  so that,  in the long-term,  they will 
facilitate adaptation to labour  force  requirements in a 
given economic  situation. 
There are three basic variations on  early retirement 
- the reduction ot the normal retirement age,  as 
provided  for  in the  schemes discussed above; 
- payment  of early pensions to elderly people 
who  have  been  unemployed  for  a  certain,  fairly 
long period of time  (e.g. 6  months  or  a  year); 
- bringing  forward  the retirement  date,  for  instance 
to the Spring,  to achieve better coordination with 
the  school-leaving date. 
The  proposals are listed in the  order of their probable 
effect  on  employment.  One  further  improvement  would  be 
the provision of scope  for  individual choice  and  the absence 
of any  compulsion to retire. Elderly people  should not  be 
forced  off the labour market  by  such measures  and  the transition 
from  working life to retirement should take place more  smoothly. 
Particular attention should be paid to this consideration 
vhen  any  extension or part-time  employment  is being discussed. 
It cannot  be entirely ruled  out,  of course,  that,  where  such 
scope  for  choice  exists,  older workers will be  urged  by 
the management  to accept  early retirement. Finally, it should 
be  pointed out that  the psychological and  social pre-requisites 
for  a  sudden increase of "early pensioners" in  ·our society 
*ust first be  created. 
If,  for  financial  or general  socio-political considerations, 
early and  voluntary (flexible)  retirement is not  possible  for all 
vorkers,  this measure  could,  ae  a  first step,  be  applied 
selectively. For consideration is a  modified retirement  age  for 
occupations with bad working conditions (shift workers etc •••  ) 
or for  the physically handicapped. 
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Early and  voluntary retirement  by older workers has 
one  important  advantage  over other work-sharing measures. 
In general,  older people  hold positions of greater status 
in a  company.  Their retirement  sets in motion  a  reshuffle 
which  improves  the  opportunities  for advancement  of the 
younger  employees.  The  posts left by  the latter can  more 
easily be  filled by  people  previously unemployed,  who  do 
not  possess the  qualifications for that particular firm, 
or not  to a  sufficient extent.  The  bottleneck in qualifications, 
which. is seen as a  possible  drawback of work-sharing,  could 
thus be  more  easily avoided. 
Extension of the period of schooling and  training 
Vocational  training measures have  proved their worth 
in earlier economic  recessions.  They  not  only draw  potential 
workers off the  labour market,  but  at  the  same  time  equip 
them  with better qualifications  for  future  jobs and  thus 
reduce  their susceptibility to unemployment.  The  experiences 
of recent years in  some  Member  States indicate,  however, 
a  decline in the  numbers  following  vocational  training 
courses.  Some  countries have  changed  the  arrangements 
governing aid  for  such courses because  the  target  groups 
hoped  for  the  "unskilled" were  not  taking part. 
Apart  from  further increases in retraining and  further 
training,  the principal measures  now  under  discussion are  those 
tntended  to contribute  to the  alleviation of youth  unemployment, 
.1nich  is causing  increasing concern in the  Member  States. 
These  opportunitiee for  improTing youth  employment 
through additional training  or longer periods of work  experience, 
c0uld  in general  ease  their transition to working life and 
p;-.~vide  them  with  useful qualifications at the  same  time. 
Th~rc is more  and  more  discus~ion (•)  on giving  up  the  traditional 
order of  separate life-phases - first training,  then  work.  in 
favour  of continual interaction between  the  two  functions. 
We  shall go  only briefly into the  demand  for longer 
compulsory  schooling.  The  effect  of this on  employment  would 
be  limited by  the  fact  that  considerable differences exist 
between  the  statutory  a~d the  actual school-leaving  age~ 
This  fact  became  very  rl,~·.q,r  in the  debate  on  the  proposed 
legislation to  len~then ccwpulsory  schooling to sixteen in 
Belgium.  Longer  schooling ia also a  problem  in  view  of the 
noticeable  school-weariness among  the age-groups  involved. 
Additional  y~ars at  school  ~ppe?r more  justified if they 
are clearly orientated  towa~ds a  ~reparation for  employment. 
Discussions are  taking place in  G~rmany on  the possible 
introduction of a  tenth basic  t~a~ning year  and  ideas are 
also moving  in this  directi.on~  Cc~·"m:.:~ny  is the  only c·ountry 
where  a  measure  of this kind is  ~0i~g seriously discussed 
at the  moment. 
(•)  See :r.  BEST,  B.  STERN;  "Education,  work,  leisure: 
must  they  come  in that  order?" 
Monthly Labor  Review 7/19?7. 